This report evaluates the accuracy of the US Intelligence Community's projections of Soviet intercontinental attack forces from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s. The evaluation is based on information available as of March 1989.

During the early 1960s, the Intelligence Community overestimated the number of ballistic missiles that the Soviets would deploy, due in part to Khrushchev's boast about ICBMs being deployed "like sausages." However, after the first overhead imagery became available, the projections were scaled back accordingly.

In the mid-1970s, the Intelligence Community made accurate predictions of the number of MIRVed ICBMs that the Soviets would field, but they overestimated the rate of modernization with new missiles carrying MIRVs. The accuracy of the overall record was due to a combination of correct estimates of the numbers of MIRVs on ICBMs and the rate at which these missiles were deployed.

However, the Intelligence Community consistently overestimated the rate of force modernization, predicting that virtually all of the ICBM force would be replaced within a 10-year period. In reality, only about 10 percent of the force has been replaced so far. The overestimates had two components: the date of initial operational capability (IOC) of a weapon system was often predicted to occur earlier than the actual date, and the rate of deployment was projected to be faster than it actually was.

The reasons for the overestimates include the Intelligence Community not correctly understanding Soviet military requirements, the Soviets slowing some weapon programs to conform to arms control limits, and some programs having serious (and expensive) technical problems.

Overall, while the Intelligence Community made some accurate predictions of Soviet strategic forces, they consistently overestimated the rate of force modernization. This evaluation highlights the challenges of predicting the development and deployment of advanced military technology, and the importance of continually updating and refining projections based on new information and evidence.

This report evaluates the accuracy of the US Intelligence Community's projections of Soviet intercontinental attack forces from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s. The evaluation is based on information available as of March 1989.

During the early 1960s, the Intelligence Community overestimated the number of ballistic missiles that the Soviets would deploy, due in part to Khrushchev's boast about ICBMs being deployed "like sausages." However, after the first overhead imagery became available, the projections were scaled back accordingly.

In the mid-1970s, the Intelligence Community made accurate predictions of the number of MIRVed ICBMs that the Soviets would field, but they overestimated the rate of modernization with new missiles carrying MIRVs. The accuracy of the overall record was due to a combination of correct estimates of the numbers of MIRVs on ICBMs and the rate at which these missiles were deployed.

However, the Intelligence Community consistently overestimated the rate of force modernization, predicting that virtually all of the ICBM force would be replaced within a 10-year period. In reality, only about 10 percent of the force has been replaced so far. The overestimates had two components: the date of initial operational capability (IOC) of a weapon system was often predicted to occur earlier than the actual date, and the rate of deployment was projected to be faster than it actually was.

The reasons for the overestimates include the Intelligence Community not correctly understanding Soviet military requirements, the Soviets slowing some weapon programs to conform to arms control limits, and some programs having serious (and expensive) technical problems.

Overall, while the Intelligence Community made some accurate predictions of Soviet strategic forces, they consistently overestimated the rate of force modernization. This evaluation highlights the challenges of predicting the development and deployment of advanced military technology, and the importance of continually updating and refining projections based on new information and evidence.